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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Her MajestyÕs Revenue & Customs (HMRC) performs a vital task in collecting taxes, 
enforcing lax laws and delivering services to taxpayers. Against a background of 
reductions in resources, it has experienced considerable difficulties in meeting the 
service expectation of taxpayers and challenging organised tax avoidance. This 
policy paper investigates the difficulties and makes recommendations to strengthen 
HMRC and its public accountability. The reforms include the following: 
1. The formation of a Supervisory Board, consisting of stakeholders, to watch over
HMRC Board to give it direction and enhance its public accountability.  The Board
shall act as a bulwark against corporate capture and inertia and be accountable to
parliamentary committees.
2. The Supervisory Board should support and protect tax whistleblowers.
3. Additional investment in HMRC resources and staffing.
4. HMRC needs local knowledge and must respond to citizensÕ concerns. This is
best achieved through a network of local offices and staff with local knowledge.
5. HMRC should have a well resourced internal investigation and prosecution unit.
This would strengthen its in-house institutional knowledge base.
6. HMRC should offer competitive financial rewards to its staff.
7. Stronger parliamentary oversight.
8. The tax returns, related computations and documents of all large companies must
be made publicly available. The public availability of corporate tax information will
improve the quality of information available to parliamentary committees to
scrutinise the effectiveness of HMRC in meeting its objectives.
9. Parliamentary committees should be empowered to examine any tax information,
no matter how sensitive. It would be up to the relevant parliamentary committee to
decide whether scrutiny of any documents and practices should be conducted in
private or closed meetings.
10.The backlog of tax cases creates uncertainties and anxieties. This is also unfair to
taxpayers. The judicial capacity to hear cases should be expanded.
11. Various reports published by HMRC should contain information that enhances
transparency and accountability.
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12. Public pressure is a vital ingredient in transforming HMRC. It should not be
diluted by the introduction of fees to challenge tax assessments.
13.HMRC needs effective tools to combat sham. We recommend a rewrite of the
General Anti Abuse Rule (GAAR). HMRC should be guided by the Department of
Justice and/or a panel of retired judges, rather than by corporate elites.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Her MajestyÕs Revenue & Customs (HMRC) performs a vital task in collecting taxes 
which enable the state to redistribute wealth, finance social investment and provide 
resources for the day-to-day operations of government departments. In 2015-16, it 
collected £536.8 billion from UK taxpayers, compared to £517.7 billion in 2014-15. It 
interacted with 45 million individuals, more than 5.4 million businesses, and paid tax 
credits to 4.4 million families and Child Benefit to 7.4 million families. These are 
commendable achievements; especially as HMRC staffing and resources have been 
substantially cut in real terms. 
HMRC efficiency and accountability is a key factor in the administration of tax 
collection, and is of national interest. In recent years, HMRC has been seen to be 
failing to provide an efficient service to taxpayers. Often taxpayers have to wait for 
long periods for an answer to telephone calls. Despite the anxieties of parliamentary 
committees, there is a dearth of test cases against multinational corporations 
avoiding taxes through profit shifting and a variety of intragroup transactions. 
Consequently, parliament is unable to enact stronger legislation to curb organised tax 
avoidance. HMRC is too close to the interests of big business and too distant from 
the concerns of ordinary taxpayers. Parliamentary committees have sought to 
examine some of the settlements of prolonged tax disputes with major corporations, 
but have been thwarted by claims of ÔconfidentialityÕ.  All in all, HMRCÕs public 
accountability needs to be strengthened and it needs additional resources. 
In assessing the steps necessary for strengthening HMRC, this report adopts the 
objectives currently used by the government. The government currently requires 
HMRC to: 
¥ Maximise tax revenues,
¥ Make sustainable cost savings
¥ Improve the service to what the government calls ÒcustomersÓ.
The above three objectives overlap. A gain in one could be to the detriment of the 
rest. For example, cost savings can be made by reducing staff, but can result in poor 
service to taxpayers. The remainder of this report uses the above three objectives to 
assess how well HMRC is meeting its objectives. As the attainment of objectives is 
enmeshed with the governance and accountability of HMRC, this report pays 
particular attention to that, and makes recommendations for strengthening HMRC. 
In order to draft this report, we discussed matters with a number of current and 
former HMRC staff (including senior staff), business advisors, accountants, lawyers, 
institutional investors and small businesses. We have been greatly assisted by 
discussions with representatives of the Association of Revenue and Customs (ARC) 
and the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS). The PCS also assisted us 
with a random survey sample of 10,000 HMRC staff which yielded a 21% response 
  4
rate. These were extremely helpful in identifying a number of issues vital to the long-
term success of HMRC. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MAXIMISING TAX REVENUES 
Tax revenues can be maximised by reducing the tax gap  and by mounting more and 1
effective prosecutions. HMRC has been found wanting in both. 
Tax Gap 
The persistence of the tax gap shows that HMRC is not maximising tax collection. 
The most recent statistics published by HMRC  put the 2013-14 UK tax gap at £34 2
billion, which is 6.4% per cent of total theoretical tax liabilities, compared to 8.4% in 
2005-06. HMRC claims that small and medium-sized enterprises account for the 
largest portion of the overall tax gap (just under half), followed by large businesses 
(just over a quarter).  
The exact details of the HMRC model for estimating the tax gap are not publicly 
available. The estimate depends on the policies and practices that HMRC is willing to 
accept or challenge. For example, a large number of multinational corporations use a 
variety of transfer pricing practices, royalty payments, management fees, interest 
payments on intragroup loans and other schemes to shift profits from the UK to low/
no tax jurisdictions. The published accounts of companies such as Google, 
Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon, Starbucks, Boots, BHS, Caff Nero and others show 
an effective tax rate considerably lower than the headline rate. One reason for this is 
that HMRC has not challenged their tax practices, whereas other countries have 
shown greater willingness to challenge the same. For example, in 2012 the Canadian 
tax authorities challenged GlaxoSmithKlineÕs transfer practices and the case was 
settled in 2015. Previously, the US had also challenged the same companyÕs transfer 
pricing practices. As HMRC does not consider the same to be tax avoidance or 
evasion, its estimate of the tax gap does not include the amounts shifted through 
transfer pricing techniques. In view of the challenges in other countries and corporate 
acceptance that there is a case to answer, it would appear that the UK estimates of 
the tax gap and tax avoidance/evasion are understated. Alternative models, 
 The Tax Gap is the difference between the amount of tax HMRC should theoretically be 1
able to collect and what it actually collects. Tax Gap broadly consists of three elements - tax 
avoidance, tax evasion and uncollected taxes/tax arrears.
 HMRC, Measuring tax gaps 2015 edition Tax gap estimates for 2013-14, London: HMRC, 2
October 2015 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
470540/HMRC-measuring-tax-gaps-2015-1.pdf).
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contested by HMRC, estimate the UK tax gap to be anything up to around £120 
billion a year . 3
Prosecutions 
A deterrent effect leading to higher tax revenues could be achieved by signalling zero 
tolerance for tax avoidance and evasion. This would require more test cases and 
legal challenges. It was announced  that between Ò2010 and 2014 HMRC secured 4
more than 2,650 criminal prosecutions and 2,718 years of prison sentences for tax 
crimesÓ. Under pressure from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC), HMRC agreed a target to increase prosecutions by 1,000 a year by 2014-15. 
However, this seems to be met by targeting less complex cases and a quarter of all 
prosecutions related to sums less than £10,000. A December 2015 report by the 
National Audit Office (NAO) noted that  
ÒAlthough HMRC cannot demonstrate that this was the right number, the 
target had the effect of prompting it to change its processes and make its 
investigations more efficient. This led it to focus on less complex cases, in 
particular a large number of prosecutions for evading income tax, VAT and 
tobacco duty, and lower-value cases Ó. 5
HMRCÕs claim that it has increased tax revenues through prosecutions is not quite 
what it seems. The NAO stated  that  6
ÒHMRC claimed £295 million in yield from the deterrent effect of its additional 
1,000 prosecutions. However, in 2015 HMRC evaluated the deterrent effect of 
these prosecutions and found it could not verify their monetary value. The 
deterrence effect is inherently difficult to evidence. HMRC has therefore 
commissioned a range of research methods including surveys, interviews and 
data analysis. HMRCÕs surveys found an increased awareness of 
prosecutions, but it proved difficult to evidence changes in behaviour or 
increases in tax revenues from prosecutionsÓ. 
 Richard Murphy, £119.4bn Tax Gap, London: PCS, 2014 (http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/3
Documents/PCSTaxGap2014.pdf) 
 HMRC press release, Statement by HMRC on tax evasion and the HSBC Suisse data leak, 4
14 February 2015 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-by-hmrc-on-tax-evasion-
and-the-hsbc-suisse-data-leak).
 National Audit Office, Tackling tax fraud: how HMRC responds to tax evasion, the hidden 5
economy and criminal attacks, London: TSO, 2015, para 16 (https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Tackling-tax-fraud-how-HMRC-responds-to-tax-evasion-the-hidden-
economy-and-criminal-attacks-Summary.pdf).
 Para 17, NAO, 2015, op cit.6
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HMRCÕs 2014-15 annual report states that it prosecuted 1,289 cases of tax-related 
crimes and secured a collective total of 407 years in prison sentences, but the report 
does not provide information about who is prosecuted and for what? How many 
relate to wealthy individuals, ordinary taxpayers, small businesses or large 
corporations?  
The Financial Times reported that the amount of tax at stake in cases that were 
successfully prosecuted last year ranged from £250 to an organised crime case 
worth £160m . More than two-thirds of cases concerned less than £100,000 of tax 7
and were together, less than 1 per cent of all cases by value. HMRC states that 
evasion of tobacco duty accounted for 13 per cent of all tax fraud risks, but was the 
subject of nearly a third of all prosecutions. 
There is a dearth of legal test cases even though in 2012 HMRC was aware  of 8
41,000 marketed schemes used by small businesses and individuals alone. HMRC 
estimates there are 30,000 users of partnership loss schemes. The House of Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee noted that  
Òwe remain concerned by the evidence we received that HMRCÕs approach to 
multinationals was not assertive enough, and the Commons Public Accounts 
CommitteeÕs critical findings of HMRC that the tax collector is not Òsufficiently 
challengingÓ of multinationals Ó.  9
The number of prosecutions for offshore tax evasion has been described by the PAC 
as Òwoefully inadequate Ó. Between 2010 and 2015, there have been only 11 10
prosecutions in relation to offshore tax evasion resulting in 15 years of jail time 
collectively (also see below).  The Committee noted that  
ÒIn December 2013, we argued that HMRC needed to demonstrate that it 
deals robustly with individuals and companies who deliberately mislead it and 
that HMRC should be more willing to pursue prosecutions against both 
 Financial Times, HMRC focuses on low-value tax prosecutions, 17 December 2015 (http://7
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a890ddf6-a3fd-11e5-873f-68411a84f346.html#axzz42mEoinsR ).
 National Audit Office, Tax avoidance: tackling marketed avoidance schemes, London: NAO 8
(https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/1213730.pdf).
 House of Lords Select Committee on Economic, Tackling corporate tax avoidance in a 9
global economy: is a new approach needed? London: TSO, July 2013, para 118. (http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldeconaf/48/48.pdf).
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs performance 10
in 2014-15, London: TSO, 2015 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/
cmselect/cmpubacc/393/393.pdf).
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individuals and businesses. Regrettably, since then HMRC appears either to 
have ignored our recommendation or to have made little progress Ó. 11
The information provided by whistle-blower Herv Daniel Marcel Falciani (former 
HSBC employee) showed that HSBCÕs Swiss operations turned a blind eye to illegal 
activities of arms dealers and helped wealthy people evade taxes. Only one 
individual from the Falciani list of some 3,600 potential UK tax evaders has been 
prosecuted. In January 2016, HMRC told the PAC that it had abandoned its criminal 
investigation into the role of HSBC in alleged illegal activities.  
In April 2016, a leak relating to Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca  revealed 12
organised tax avoidance and evasion. The leaked information consists of some 11.5 
million documents and 2.6 terabytes of information relating to over 300,000 
companies. HMRC claims that some 70 staff  are examining the data. This may well 13
suffer the same fate as the HSBC inquiry (see above), especially as the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR) acknowledges that due to cuts in staffing HMRC has 
been less effective in handling data about previous disclosures of tax avoidance. For 
example, in relation to a tax disclosure facility related to Jersey, Guernsey, and Isle of 
Man, the OBR  noted: 14
ÒBudget 2013 measures announced a disclosure facility with the crown 
dependencies and was originally costed to raise £1,050 million from 2013-14 
to 2017-18. ... We lowered our forecast of the total yield to £800 million in 
November. ... The disclosure facility closed on 31 December 2015 and HMRC 
has informed us that there were far fewer disclosures than expected. They 
believe this is due to a number of factors, including HMRC campaigns being 
less effective and with less coverage than expected and a perceived lack of 
awareness from those targeted. HMRC is also now less optimistic about how 
much of the lost yield can be recouped through additional compliance activity, 
on the basis that they are unlikely to be able to work the higher number of 
additional cases on top of existing workloads. Taking both factors into account, 
we have lowered the costing for this measure by a further £530 millionÓ. 
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs performance 11
in 2014Ð15, London: TSO, 2015, page 6.
 The Guardian, What are the Panama Papers? A guide to history's biggest data leak, 5 12
April 2016 (http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-
the-panama-papers).
 See Q32 of the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts Report, Quality service 13
to personal taxpayers and replacing the Aspire contract, July 2016 (http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmpubacc/78/78.pdf).
 Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2016, page 223 14
(http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org.uk/March2016EFO.pdf).
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HMRC offers voluntary disclosure facilities to tax evaders to settle their tax affairs 
and claims that some of the individuals settled their affairs by using such a facility in 
return for reduced penalties of up to 30% of the tax due compared to a maximum 
penalty of 200% where a voluntary disclosure is not made. So criminal prosecutions 
can be avoided by voluntary disclosures and this begs questions about any deterrent 
strategy used by HMRC. 
HMRC executives  told the PAC that its investigations into transfer pricing 15
arrangements take 22 months on average, and that only about 35 wealthy individuals 
are investigated for tax evasion each year. Consequently, it is unable to maximise tax 
revenues by checking tax avoidance and evasion. 
HMRC claims to increase tax revenues by settling long-standing tax disputes. Good 
examples of this are the settlement of disputes with Vodafone, Goldman Sachs , 16
and Google . However, there are questions about whether the settlements are 17
reasonable. Parliamentary committees have not been able to reach any meaningful 
conclusions as HMRC has sheltered behind claims of confidentiality of information 
and refused to provide the relevant documents to the committees. A disturbing aspect 
of these episodes is that HMRC appears to be held to ransom by some companies. 
For example the case of UK Uncut Legal Action Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs & 
Anor [2013] EWHC 1283 (Admin) (16 May 2013) showed that in November 2010 
Goldman Sachs had secured concessions from HMRC and to prevent HMRC from 
renegotiating, it  
Òthreatened to withdraw from the Code if HMRC withdrew from the November 
settlementÓ.  
A withdrawal would have embarrassed the Chancellor, who had announced that 
major banks had signed up to a voluntary code of taxation (soft law). The case 
suggests that companies may use voluntary codes to secure economic advantages. 
There have been no prosecutions by HMRC or HM Treasury against the designers of 
tax avoidance schemes. In 2005, an internal HMRC study  concluded that the UK-18
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Tackling Tax Fraud, March 2016 15
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmpubacc/674/674.pdf)/
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & 16
Customs 2010Ð11 Accounts: tax disputes, London: TSO, 2011 (http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1531/1531.pdf).
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Corporate tax settlements. TSO: 17
London, 24 February 2016 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/
cmpubacc/788/788.pdf).
 The Guardian, Gilt-edged profits for profession's 'big four', 7 February 2009 (https://18
www.theguardian.com/business/2009/feb/07/tax-gap-avoidance-schemes).
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based Big Four accounting firms (KPMG, Deloitte, Ernst & Young and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) generated around £1 billion in fees each year from 
"commercial tax planning" and "artificial avoidance schemes". There are a number of 
court cases in which the judges have declared the schemes designed, marketed and 
implemented by the big four firms to be unlawful. In the case of Revenue and 
Customs v Pendragon plc & Ors (Rev 1) [2015] UKSC 37 (10 June 2015), the UK 
Supreme Court rejected a tax avoidance scheme designed by KPMG and the 
presiding judge said: ÒIn my opinion the KPMG scheme was an abuse of lawÓ. This 
abuse has a long history. For example, a tax avoidance scheme designed by Ernst & 
Young and used by Debenhams and 70 other major high street retailers was thrown 
out by the Court of Appeal (HM Revenue & Customs v Debenhams Retail Plc [2005] 
EWCA Civ 892). About £300 million of tax revenues were at stake in this one scheme 
alone and a Treasury spokesperson said that  
"This was one of the most blatantly abusive avoidance scams of recent years, 
and the court's decision to quash it is very welcome ".   19
Despite public statements, successive governments have been unable or unwilling to 
prosecute or fine any of the enablers and designers of avoidance schemes. The failures 
mean that HMRCÕs deterrents are weak and as a result tax revenues are not collected. 
After years of inertia, in August 2016, the government announced proposals  which if 20
enacted could see accountants, lawyers and other enablers of avoidance schemes face 
fines if up to 100 percent of tax that is unpaid as a result of their advice. For such 
proposals to have any teeth, HMRC would need staff, resources, stronger public 
accountability and independence from corporate interests. 
Summary 
This chapter has identified continued weaknesses in maximising tax revenues. 
Revenues could be maximised through the deterrent effect of prosecutions and test 
cases, but that is low. Little effective action has been taken to tackle the tax 
avoidance industry or big companies. 
 The Daily Telegraph, Debenhams lose VAT case, 19 July 2005 (http://19
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2919204/Debenhams-loses-VAT-case.html).
 HMRC, Strengthening Tax Avoidance Sanctions and Deterrents: A discussion document (https://20
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/546589/
Strengthening_Tax_Avoidance_Sanctions_and_Deterrents-discussion_document.pdf) , 17 August 
2016.
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CHAPTER 3 
SUSTAINABLE COST SAVINGS 
Cuts in resources and staffing have reduced HMRCÕs capacity to provide an efficient 
service to taxpayers, investigate cases of tax avoidance and take legal action against 
avoiders and evaders. 
Cuts in Resources 
Information technology and efficient work practices can reduce the cost of tax 
collection and improve the quality of service to taxpayers, but the governmentÕs 
emphasis on Ôcost savingsÕ has become a euphemism for cuts and privatisation. 
Economic globalisation and mobility of capital have increased opportunities for tax 
avoidance, but successive governments have reduced HMRCÕs budget and staffing 
levels. The chart below shows that HMRCÕs budget has decreased  in real terms 21
despite the recent so-called additional funding provided for large business 
investigations. HMRCÕs 2015-16 budget was £3.2 billion, a small increase over the 
previous year, but the general trend is unmistakably downwards. 
The financial cuts have resulted in lower capacity for dealing with enforcement issues 
and has affected HMRCÕs ability to respond to run of the mill enquiries from 
customers.  
 HMRC business plan: 2014 to 2016 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hmrcs-21
business-plan-2014-to-2016/hmrc-business-plan-2014-to-2016).
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In 2004, at the time of the merger, the Inland Revenue and HM Customs & Excise 
had a combined staff of 100,000, almost immediately reduced to 90,000. The chart 
below shows that nearly 30,000 jobs have disappeared between 2005 and 2014.  
HMRCÕs 2015-16 annual reports shows that by March 2016 its headcount stood at 
59,857, an increase of 2,700 over the previous year, mainly to meet the pressure on 
phone lines. However, HMRC has plans to reduce staff to below 50,000, and possibly 
as low as 41,000 . The staff reductions come from the November 2015 22
announcement termed ÒBuilding Our FutureÓ which proposed to reduce the HMRC 
estate from 170 locations to 13 regional hubs and four specialist sites. By 2021, 137 
sites will be closed . HMRC has already closed its entire office enquiry network 23
removing the option of face-to-face services for approximately 2.5 million members of 
the public even though multinational companies, such as Google, Vodafone and 
Goldman Sachs, can be assured of one-to-one assistance. This has intensified 
pressures on its telephone services. HMRC handles about 60 million telephone calls 
a year and because of the shortage of staff at least 25% of calls go either 
unanswered or are not answered within HMRCÕs own time targets. Every £1 saved 
by HMRC on its telephone services results in an estimated £4 in additional costs to 
customers.  
Cost savings made via prolonged wage freezes have been counterproductive and 
have caused problems in recruitment and retention of staff. The knock-on effect has 
been to increase costs due to over-time payments in order to process work in the 
absence of sufficient staff. Approximately £5 million is spent each month on overtime 
payments to plug the gaps. Lack of competitive financial rewards fuels increased 
Hansard, House of commons Debates, Adjournment Debate Ð HMRC: Building Our Future 22
Plan, 28 April 2016 (https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-04-28/debates/
16042848000002/HMRCBuildingOurFuturePlan)  
 Page 26, National Audit Office, HM Revenue & Customs 2015-16 Accounts, 2016 (https://23
www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HMRC-Annual-Report-and-
Accounts-2015-16.pdf)
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staff turnover and poor morale makes it difficult to retain experienced staff who are 
often poached by big accountancy, law and financial service companies. One effect 
of the HMRC budget cuts is that it lacks resources for investigations and 
prosecutions. In February 2016, HMRC had 81 transfer pricing specialists. An 
investigation into just one major company (e.g. Google, Goldman Sachs) used up 
between 10 and 30 specialists, leaving little time for others. In contrast, the big four 
accounting firms alone had four times as many transfer pricing specialists .  24
HMRC does not appear to have properly resourced internal prosecution units. It 
routinely hires external lawyers to argue its case in courts. The extensive reliance on 
external experts results in a weak institutional knowledge base. Unsurprisingly, 
HMRC is often unwilling or unable to tackle tax avoidance and evasion by large and 
comparatively well-resourced companies. 
Privatisation 
The government has sought cost savings through privatisation and Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) deals, but the outcomes have been problematical. In April 2001, HM 
Customs & Excise and the Inland Revenue (predecessors to HMRC) transferred the 
ownership and management of 415 leasehold and 159 freehold buildings and offices 
to Mapeley, a private sector consortium in a 20-year PFI deal. HMRC continued to 
occupy the buildings. Mapeley paid the government £220 million for the estate and a 
further £150 million over the first ten years of the contract, through reductions in the 
annual charges paid by HMRC. On signing the contract, Mapeley transferred the 
freehold and long leasehold properties to a company based in Bermuda. By 2012/13, 
the group was thought to be headquartered in Guernsey. The PFI deal enabled 
Mapeley to avoid capital gains and corporate tax on its activities on the properties 
formerly owned by the government. The companyÕs shareholders were also based 
offshore and therefore unlikely to have paid income tax and National Insurance 
Contributions (NIC) on profits generated in the UK. 
Mapeley properties are soon due for rent renewals.  Many of the Mapeley properties 
are in desirable city centre locations and have lucrative alternative uses (hotels, 
shops, clubs, and offices) and can generate higher rental income for its owners. So 
HMRC is facing higher rental costs, but its budget is being cut in real terms. The 
large scale closure of HMRC offices (see above) is partly influenced by the fallout 
from the previous privatisation deals .  25
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Corporate Tax Settlements, London: 24
TSO, February 2016, page 9 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/
cmpubacc/788/788.pdf).
HMRC press release, HMRC announces next step in its ten-year modernisation 25
programme to become a tax authority fit for the future, 12 November 2015 (https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/hmrc-announces-next-step-in-its-ten-year-modernisation-
programme-to-become-a-tax-authority-fit-for-the-future).
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The public has obtained poor value in other privatisations too. For example, in 
relation to the Aspire contract (an acronym for ÔAcquiring Strategic Partners for the 
Inland RevenueÕ) which provides for a variety of computer hardware and software 
services, the PAC wrote : ÒHMRC has been outmanoeuvred by suppliers at key 26
moments in the Aspire contract, hindering its ability to get long term value for money. 
The contract, which cost £7.9 billion from July 2004 to March 2014, has generated a 
combined profit for Capgemini and Fujitsu of £1.2 billion, equivalent to 16% of the 
contract value paid to these suppliers. HMRC considers the contract to have been 
expensive, and pressure to find cost savings in the short-term led it to trade away 
important value for money controlsÓ. On 30 March 2016, HMRC announced that it 
has reached a final agreement with its major IT suppliers on the phased exit of the 
£10 billion Aspire IT contract . The House of Commons Committee of Public 27
Accounts concluded that ÒHMRC demonstrated little appreciation of the scale of the 
challenge it faced in replacing its Aspire IT contract Ó. The Committee will revisit the 28
matter as HMRC develops a replacement project. 
A number of services, such as cleaning, mailing and security, have been privatised 
and/or subcontracted. Often staff have been put on inferior employment contracts . 29
In 2007, it came to light that sensitive data relating to millions of individuals sent via 
internal post, run by the courier firm TNT went missing . The government  has 30 31
announced further privatisation of HMRC services, including the use of private sector 
debt collection agencies and private companies to carry out fraud and error checks. 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts,  Managing and replacing the Aspire 26
contract, London: TSO (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/
cmpubacc/705/705.pdf)
 HMRC press release, HMRC announces agreement to exit its £10 billion IT contract, 30 27
March 2016 (http://www.mynewsdesk.com/uk/hm-revenue-customs-hmrc/pressreleases/
hmrc-announces-agreement-to-exit-its-ps10-billion-it-contract-1356780).
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Quality of service to personal 28
taxpayers and replacing the Aspire contract, July 2016, p. 3.
 The Guardian, Whitehall cleaners gather outside HMRC to campaign for living wage, 17 29
October 2014, (http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/oct/17/whitehall-cleaner-hmrc-
campaign-living-wage).
 BBC News, Six more data discs 'are missing', 24 November 2007 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/30
hi/uk_politics/7111056.stm)
 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/31
uploads/attachment_data/file/263942/35062_Autumn_Statement_2013.pdf).
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In 2013, HMRC signed a £20 million contract with CDMS Ltd  (trading as Transactis) 32
and Bosch Security Systems Ltd to outsource much of the Benefits & Credits 
directorate. In 2014, HMRCÕs post handling services  were privatised by signing a 33
contract with the EDM Group. The company scans incoming post and provides 
HMRC with a digital version within 48 hours of receipt. The computer system for tax 
credits was outsourced to US business services giant Concentrix  on a £75 million, 34
three-year deal but had many problems. The ad hoc privatisation raises serious 
concerns about efficiency and effectiveness. There is little publicly available 
information about value for money, efficiency, security, privacy, exploitation of data 
and public accountability of such changes. Much of the tender information remains 
confidential. 
Summary 
HMRC has faced considerable reduction in staffing and resources. Some services 
have been privatised and outsourced. The cost reductions have eroded efficiency 
and effectiveness of HMRC. Privatisation has not delivered the promised savings or 
increases in efficiency and effectiveness. 
HMRC, Benefits and Credits: Tax Credits Error and Fraud Additional Capacity Trial, May 32
2014 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/308696/
Tax_Credits_Error_and_Fraud_Additional_Capacity_Trial_-_Final_Evaluation.pdf).
http://www.accountingweb.co.uk/article/hmrc-privatise-post-handling/557295; 23 April 2014.33
 Accountancy Age, Staff paid to go home as outsourced HMRC IT system fails, 27 34
February 2015 (http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/2397321/exclusive-staff-paid-to-
go-home-as-hmrc-it-system-fails?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter).
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CHAPTER 4 
SERVICE TO CUSTOMERS 
There is considerable dissatisfaction with the quality of service provided by HMRC to 
customers. 
Poor Service to Customers 
The pursuit of short-term cost savings, loss of staff, wage freezes and poor value 
from a number of IT projects has had a negative impact on services to taxpayers or 
what are sometimes called customers. These problems are deeply rooted and have 
persisted over a number of years. The 2014-15 report of the PAC noted   that 35
around £1.2 billion was wrongly paid by HMRC in tax credits due to fraud and error; 
HMRC failed to answer a quarter of the approximately 60 million calls it receives a 
year.  
HMRC call centres are poorly resourced and Citizens Advice has stated that 
thousands of people were waiting 47 minutes to get their calls answered .  The PAC 36
concluded that  
ÒHMRC is still failing to provide an acceptable service to customers and could 
not tell us when it would be able to do so. In March 2013, the previous 
Committee concluded that HMRC had "an abysmal record on customer 
service", having only answered 74% of telephone calls received by its contact 
centres during 2011-12. In 2014-15, HMRC responded to just 72.5% of calls 
and over the first half of 2015 this had fallen to 50%. The previous Committee 
considered that HMRCÕs target of answering 80% of telephone calls within five 
minutes was "woefully inadequate and unambitious" and recommended that 
HMRC should set a more challenging short-term target for call-waiting times 
and a long-term target that is much closer to industry standardsÓ.  
There have been marginal improvements and the 2016 NAO report noted that only 
58% of the ÒcustomersÓ considered HMRCÕs service to be good or excellent . 37
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts,  HM Revenue & Customs 35
performance in 2014-15, London: TSO, 2015 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201516/cmselect/cmpubacc/393/393.pdf)
 BBC News, HMRC defends call waiting times of 47 minutes, 9 September 2015 (http://36
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34195843).
 National Audit Office, HM Revenue and Customs: The quality of service for personal 37
taxpayers. London, NAO, May 2016.
  17
HMRC has a history of poorly managing its computer systems and millions of 
taxpayers have received erroneous statements . In March 2016, the House of Lords 38
Economic Affairs Committee  criticised HMRC for failure to communicate important 39
changes in tax rules to the public. The Forum of Private Business said:  
ÒWe represent over 20,000 small and medium-sized businesses throughout 
the UK. In this submission we have collected together information and 
evidence from our members which highlight the problems with HMRC. From 
the evidence provided by our members it is clear that HMRC is not fulfilling its 
aims as an organisation. It is slow and inefficient, with many of its online 
systems too complicated for our members to use Ó. 40
Public pressure is an essential element in persuading HMRC to improve the quality, 
efficiency and effectiveness of its services. However, it is likely to be stifled as the 
government is contemplating fees for access to courts, including fees for challenging 
assessments raised by HMRC . A 2015 consultation paper by the Ministry of Justice 41
proposed fees of between £50 and £200 for referring cases to the first-tier tax 
tribunal, with hearing fees to range from £200 to £1,000 depending on their 
complexity. Appeals to the upper tribunal would incur an initial fee of £100, plus up to 
£2,000 for a hearing. Such a policy, if enacted, would further commodify access to 
the legal system and ensure that only the wealthy can challenge tax authorities. Such 
a policy is likely to reduce the number of complaints against HMRC and would 
reduce the pressures on HMRC to improve the quality of its service.  
Summary 
There is considerable public dissatisfaction with the quality of service delivered by 
HMRC. This increases public frustration and costs to taxpayers, and reduces 
confidence in HMRC. 
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue and CustomsÕ 2009 Ð 10 38
Accounts, February 2011 (http://www.parliament.uk/pagefiles/54525/CRC%20Final.pdf).
 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-39
affairs-finance-bill-sub-committee/news-parliament-2015/draft-finance-bill-2016-report/
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtreasy/memo/hmrc/05.htm40
 Ministry of Justice, Court and Tribunal Fees: The government response to consultation on 41
enhanced fees for divorce proceedings, possession claims, and general applications in civil 
proceedings and Consultation on further fees proposals, August 2015. 
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CHAPTER 5 
HMRC GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
HMRC successes and failures are the outcome of its governance structures. HMRC 
Board is responsible for good governance. Amongst other things it must investigate 
violations of tax laws and consider appropriate responses. For it to be effective and 
seen to be effective there must be some distance between HMRC and corporate 
interests subject to its jurisdictions. However, increasingly that distance has been 
eroded and HMRC is perceived to attach too great a weight to the interests of large 
corporations. Such concerns could be addressed by robust public accountability 
mechanisms which give voice to the concerns of other stakeholders, but they are 
weak. Parliamentary Committees have not been able to scrutinise some aspects of 
HMRC operations. 
Corporate Influence 
HMRC is a non-ministerial department and is different from most other government 
departments which work under the direct day-to-day control of a minister. The Queen 
appoints Commissioners of HMRC who are responsible for providing leadership to 
the department and for managing its resources efficiently and effectively and for 
delivering the objectives and targets set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The 
Commissioners meet formally and make decisions within HMRCÕs Board and 
Executive Committees.  
Currently, the HMRC Board consists of seven Commissioners and five non-executive 
directors. The Commissioners are: 
1. Jon Thompson, Chief Executive and Permanent Secretary;
2. Edward Troup, Executive Chair and Permanent Secretary;
3. Jennie Granger, Director General Enforcement and Compliance;
4. Jim Harra, Director General Business Tax;
5. Justin Holliday,  Chief Finance Officer;
6. Ruth Owen, Director General Personal Tax; and
7. Nick Lodge, Director General Benefits & Credits.
Commissioners are responsible for the collection and management of revenue, the 
enforcement of prohibitions and restrictions and other functions, such as the payment 
of tax credits. 
The Executive Chair leads the Board and has ultimate responsibility for the 
departmentÕs strategy, safeguarding of its reputation and supporting the executive 
team who are responsible for the departmentÕs performance. The Executive Chair 
also leads on providing tax policy advice to ministers and overseeing the relationship 
with HM Treasury. The current Executive Chair is Edward Troup. Since 2012, he has 
also been in charge of scrutinising tax settlements for HMRC. Previously, he ran the 
corporate tax practice of City law firm Simmons & Simmons. He has been a vocal 
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opponent of the attempts to clamp down on tax avoidance and in 1999 said  that 42
ÒTaxation is legalised extortion and is valid only to the extent of the lawÓ. He has been 
a known defender of tax havens and an opponent of the General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule (GAAR) . 43
The non-executive directors are appointed by HM Treasury, normally for a three year 
term. These are: 
1. Ian Barlow, HMRC lead non-executive director and chair (former senior
partner KPMG; former chairman of WSP Group plc; former member of CBI Tax
Committee; former director, Racing Enterprises Limited, London Development
Agency; non executive director Smith & Nephew, Brunner Investment Trust,
chairman of The Racecourse Association), HMRC Lead Non-Executive
Director;
2. Joanna Baldwin (Non-Executive Director and Member of the Strategy
Committee for Aviva France );44
3. John  Whiting (former PricewaterhouseCoopers partner and Tax Director of
the Office of Tax Simplification) Chair, HMRC Audit and Risk Committee;
4. Mervyn Walker (former director at Anglo American   and British Airways);45
5. Simon Ricketts (former director at Rolls Royce and a non-executive director
with the National Savings and Investment Bank; also held senior positions at
Scottish and Newcastle, Cadbury Schweppes and British Steel).
The HMRC Board consists of nine men and three women. It is assisted by three 
further non-executive directors who serve on the BoardÕs committees. 
1. Leslie Ferrar (former tax partner at KPMG, Treasurer to Charles, Prince of
Wales from 2005 to 2012; and subsequently non-executive director of Penna
Consulting, Secure Income REIT plc, Risk Advisory Group and The Rothschild
Foundation);
 Cited in the House of Common Library Briefing Number 02956: Tax avoidance: a General 42
Anti-Avoidance Rule - background history (1997- 2010), 15 May 2015. (http://
researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN02956/SN02956.pdf).
 Private Eye, New Troup movements at HMRC, Issue 1413 (http://www.private-eye.co.uk/43
news).
 Aviva is one of a number of financial institutions names in the Luxembourg leaks which 44
enjoyed the benefits of secret tax deals in Luxembourg, according to the documents leaked 
to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism (http://www.thelocal.fr/20141106/
luxembourg-france-tax-avoidance-fight).
 Anglo American is a heavy user of offshore subsidiaries (https://www.actionaid.org.uk/45
sites/default/files/doc_lib/collateral_damage.pdf).
  20
2. Diane Herbert (present and past links  with Mindshift Ltd, Housing for46
Women, Channel 4 and The Walt Disney Company);
3. Paul Smith (former Finance Director of Ford UK)
Within HMRC there are numerous specialist and focus groups and subgroups . The 47
HMRC Board has individuals previously connected with major corporations, tax 
avoidance industry (e.g. KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers), but none from civil 
society, HMRC employees, small businesses, ordinary taxpayers or anyone 
representing citizens on social security benefits. This is unhealthy and does not 
enable HMRC to see poor service, policies and practices from the perspective of 
various stakeholders. 
HMRCÕs closeness to big business gives corporations and accountancy firms an 
ÔinsiderÕ status. Representatives of large businesses enjoy considerable privileges in 
drafting tax laws and shaping the enforcement practices. They also exploit their 
inside knowledge to make private profits. For example, a working group consisting 
entirely of representatives from GlaxoSmithKline, Rolls-Royce, Eisai, Syngenta, 
Shell, Dyson, Arm, Fusion IP, Vectura, and Technology Research Ltd drafted what 
eventually became known as the Patent Box legislation . It had no representatives 48
from any other section of society. Corporate representatives also designed the 
Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) legislation. Both laws gave corporations tax 
concessions. It was not long before the tax avoidance industry was exploiting the 
opportunities offered by its insider status. The PAC wrote that it was 
 Òvery concerned by the way that the four firms appear to use their insider 
knowledge of legislation to sell clients advice on how to use those rules to pay 
less tax. KPMG seconded staff to advise government on tax legislation, 
including the development of the ÔControlled Foreign CompanyÕ and ÔPatent 
BoxÕ rules. It then produced marketing brochures relating to both sets of rules 
highlighting the role its staff had in advising government. The brochure ÔPatent 
Box: whatÕs in it for youÕ, suggests that the legislation is a business opportunity 
to reduce UK tax and that KPMG can help clients in the Ôpreparation of 
defendable expense allocationÕ. KPMG denied that it was advising its clients 
on how to use those laws in ways that Parliament did not intend, but we are 
 As per https://www.linkedin.com/in/diane-herbert-0a8b34546
 For some details see the Assurance CommissionerÕs  2014 - 15 report, https://www.gov.uk/47
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/444911/
How_we_resolve_tax_disputes.pdf
 As per https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/the-patent-box.48
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not convinced by its insistence that all the advice it offers to clients seeks to 
fulfil the purpose of the legislation Ó. 49
HMRC Public Accountability 
HMRC publishes an annual report highlighting key aspects of its performance during 
the year. Such reports are subject to scrutiny by the National Audit Office (NAO) and 
hearings by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Depending on the issues, other 
parliamentary committees may also hold hearings and question HMRC staff. 
Since 2013, and following pressure from the PAC, the annual report has been 
supplemented by a ÒHow we resolve Tax DisputesÓ report from the newly designated 
Assurance Commissioner  (Edward Troup). This development came after public 50
concern that HMRC may have reached special tax deals/settlements with Vodafone 
and Goldman Sachs . The background is that due to the complexity of the tax affairs 51
of major corporations, the parties may reach an impasse and may be willing to reach 
a negotiated tax settlement. The question is whether the settlement is fair and 
reasonable for taxpayers. The PAC sought access to the hard documentation relating 
to the settlements with Vodafone, Goldman Sachs and others, but HMRC sheltered 
behind the cloak of taxpayer confidentiality and refused to provide the relevant 
documents. The PAC hearing was followed by a NAO report which noted that  
ÒThe Department intends to appoint an assurance Commissioner, who will 
have to approve all settlement proposals over £100 million. The assurance 
Commissioner will have no role in individual taxpayerÕs affairs, so that their 
role as an independent check on settlements is not compromised. The 
assurance Commissioner will also review future settlements to check whether 
internal governance processes have been followed Ó. 52
The PAC holds one or more annual hearings to examine HMRC report(s). In recent 
years, HMRC Commissioners have also attended additional hearings relating to tax 
avoidance by companies. Depending on the issues, other parliamentary committees 
(e.g. House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee) can also hold hearings.  However, 
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Tax avoidance: the role 49
of large accountancy firms, London: TSO, 2013 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/870/870.pdf)
 The first report is available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/50
attachment_data/file/210246/3741_Tax_Assurance_AR_accessible.pdf
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & 51
Customs 2010Ð11 Accounts: tax disputes, London: TSO, 2011 (http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1531/1531.pdf).
 National Audit Office, Settling Large Tax Disputes, London:  NAO, 2012 (https://52
www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/1213188.pdf).
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the Committees have not always been able to secure the information necessary for 
its effective scrutiny. The same shroud of confidentiality has also prevented the PAC 
from an effective evaluation of matters relating to privatisation and outsourcing of 
some of the HMRCÕs activities  
In December 2011, after attempts to secure information about what appeared to be a 
special settlement with Vodafone and Goldman Sachs, the PAC wrote :  53
Òhe Department has insisted on keeping conidential the details of speciic settlements 
with large companies, even where there have been legitimate concerns about the handling 
of cases. Details of some cases only reached the public domain because the press secured 
the details. We recognise the general intention of the legislation is to keep taxpayers’ 
details conidential, but there is a provision which allows the Commissioners to authorise 
disclosure in certain circumstances. Furthermore, HMRC has a clear duty to assist 
Parliament in its work to establish value for money and detailed information can be 
necessary if Parliament is to properly meet its obligations. Given the public interest in 
these very large settlements, it is not unreasonable that they should be subject to more 
speciic scrutiny. As it stands, the Department’s decision to withhold details from us 
reduces transparency and makes it impossible for Parliament to hold Commissioners to 
account. his situation is entirely unacceptable”. 
he issues about conidentiality arose again in 2016 when it became known that with a 
payment of £130 million Google had settled approximately ten years’ disputed UK tax 
liabilities. Once again, the PAC could not secure any meaningful information to make 
assessment of HMRC diligence and eiciency. he PAC wrote  that 54
 “The lack of transparency about tax settlements makes it impossible to judge 
whether HMRC has settled this case for the right amount of taxÓ. 
It may be argued that the Assurance Commissioner publishes an annual report on 
settlement of tax disputes to reassure parliament and the public that all good and 
legal processes have been followed to settle disputes and collect the appropriate tax 
revenues. Such a report is, however, not a substitute for detailed parliamentary 
scrutiny. The tone of the Assurance Commissioner reports is often self-congratulatory 
and disclosures are inadequate. There are no details about any specific cases, the 
total amount of tax in dispute, the number of disputes outstanding for more than one, 
five, or ten years; the reasons for the delay, the nature of the dispute, involvement of 
third parties (e.g. other tax authorities), the expected period of settlement, etc. There 
  House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & 53
Customs 2010Ð11 Accounts: tax disputes, London: TSO, 2011
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts,  Corporate tax settlements, February 54
2016, London: TSO (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/
cmpubacc/788/788.pdf )
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is still the thorny question of private settlements. The taxpayer making the settlement 
(e.g. Google, Vodafone, Goldman Sachs) is aware of the particular limitations and 
interpretations of laws and the nature of the settlement, which can then become a 
precedent for future liabilities. However, other taxpayers are not aware of the 
precedents and thus cannot take advantage of the rules. As long as the 
interpretations of law remain private then parliament is not in a position to consider 
making revisions to those laws.  
Summary 
HMRC is too close to organised corporate interests. Its board and various 
committees and working parties are colonised by representatives from big business, 
many of whom are directly implicated in tax avoidance or designing, marketing and 
implementing tax avoidance schemes.  There is virtually no representation from other 
sections of society who might express counter views or raise uncomfortable 
questions about service to customers, quality of proposed laws, levels of 
enforcement or corporate capture of HMRC. Various reports are a good means of 
communicating information, but they do not deliver adequate accountability to 
taxpayers or confer rights on taxpayers to question HMRC. Parliamentary 
Committees are a crucial means of public accountability, but they have been unable 
to examine some aspects of HMRCÕs operations. Thus, there is a considerable public 
accountability deficit. 
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CHAPTER 6 
AN EVALUATION OF HMRC GOVERNANCE 
This report has sought to examine HMRCÕs fitness to deliver its mission, which is to 
maximise tax revenues, make sustainable cost savings, and improve service to 
taxpayers. Despite considerable achievements, the tax gap has persisted though 
HMRC claims that it has marginally declined. The data produced by HMRC cannot 
easily be independently corroborated. HMRC does not report on the scale of 
aggressive tax avoidance, or profit shifting. Consequently, HMRCÕs estimate of the 
tax gap is likely to be understated. 
Tax revenues can be increased by a greater willingness to investigate and/or 
prosecute tax avoiders and evaders. This can help to clarify the law and enable 
parliament to enact more effective legislation to achieve the desired goals.  At the 
very least, this can send a strong signal and act as a deterrent. However, HMRC 
does not have a good record. HMRC claims that prosecutions have resulted in 
additional revenues, but the NAO has noted that such claims are not always easy to 
verify. HMRC has increased prosecutions, but has primarily targeted less complex 
cases with lower financial values. It has been ÒwoefulÓ in tackling offshore tax evasion 
and even when handed a massive dossier on tax evasion facilitated by HSBC it failed 
to act decisively.  
Offshore tax evasion may be one of the toughest areas to prosecute as the 
perpetrators deliberately disguise their activities, but that requires resources, 
strategies and determination. Major transnational corporations (e.g. Google. 
Facebook, Microsoft, Starbucks) have become very adept at shifting profits, but 
HMRC has not brought any test cases. The failure to mount legal challenges and 
prosecutions means that HMRC is not able to maximise tax collection. This also 
means that the weaknesses of the existing legislation are not identified and 
parliament cannot easily introduce tighter laws. It sends a signal to corporations and 
individuals that as things stand, tax avoidance/evasion can be a risk worth taking. 
Whilst we accept there is no simple linear relationship between the number of HMRC 
staff and taxes collected, the data suggests that a compliance officer paid a salary of 
approximately £30k per annum can bring in a tax yield of approximately £1m per 
annum. HMRC has lost over 40,000 jobs since 2005. The continuous job erosion and 
wage freezes have resulted in low staff morale. HMRC lacks adequate resources to 
discharge its obligations effectively, resulting in poor service to taxpayers, tax 
collection and prosecutions. Taxpayers are concerned about the long wait for a reply 
to telephone enquiries.  HMRC needs to go through a period of consolidation. 
The loss of local offices means that taxpayers are no longer able to access face to 
face services and the person at the end of the phone is not always the person 
available again for any follow-up enquiries. This is disruptive and time consuming. 
Reliance on call centres is also problematic as taxpayers are not standardised units 
but individuals with their own particular concerns. Most of the people contacting 
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HMRC are lay persons, often without the relevant tax or legal knowledge and 
concerned about incorrect tax assessments or personal tax codes.  
Waiting in long telephone queues only adds to taxpayer anxiety and frustration. The 
absence of a local presence means that HMRC is not able to build local expertise 
and intelligence. For example, oil, fisheries, software, manufacturing and other 
businesses have their own peculiarities which are embedded in particular local 
environments. All business advisers that we met (over one hundred) complained that 
HMRC staff were too divorced from the local environment and often lacked detailed 
knowledge of local businesses. HMRC have tried to save some costs by centralising 
its operations, but the impact on businesses has been detrimental. 
A major reason for HMRCÕs failure to maximise tax revenues is its closeness to big 
business. Seemingly, to appease big corporations, the government has virtually 
privatised tax policymaking and enforcement. HMRC board is dominated by 
corporate interests and has no representation from other stakeholders, including 
normal taxpayers and employees. It is a matter of concern that HMRC is being run by 
individuals with a publicly declared aversion to clampdown on tax avoidance. As we 
highlighted above, Edward Troup, the recently appointed Executive Chair of HMRC, 
has been a defender of tax havens, an opponent of clampdown on tax avoidance and 
has indeed described taxation, which pays his salary, as Òlegalised extortionÓ.   
Unsurprisingly, HMRC is soft on big corporations and rarely takes effective action 
against big corporations. The task of HMRC is to apply the law, collect tax revenues, 
and litigate where necessary. The tax commissioners need not be hostile to big 
corporations, but there needs to be considerable distance between the HMRC board 
and big business. In principle, non-executive directors should provide some checks 
and balances and challenge the dominant views but they come entirely from big 
corporations and accountancy firms, often with a record of aggressive tax avoidance 
and engagement in avoidance schemes declared to be unlawful by the courts.  
In addition to the Board level, corporations also exercise undue influence in 
designing policies and legislation. We noted earlier that KPMG exploited that position 
to make private profits. Of course, this is not the only example. In 2013, the 
government sought to expand HMRCÕs armoury by introducing an anti-avoidance 
measure known as the General Anti Abuse Rule  (GAAR). However, HMRC is 55
shackled and cannot on its own initiative pursue ÒabusiveÓ practices. It needs 
permission from a Panel, which entirely consists of business people and has no 
representation from other stakeholders. The Panel  is chaired by Patrick Mears, a 56
senior tax partner at law firm Allen and Overy. Other members are Michael Hardwick, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/55
399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Guidance_Parts_A-
C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf
 As per https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/general-anti-abuse-rule-advisory-panel 56
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a consultant at law firm Linklaters; Brian Jackson, vice-president for group tax at 
Burberry  group plc and previously tax partner at KPMG ; Sue Laing, a partner at 57 58
law firm Boodle Hatfield; Gary Shiels, a business consultant; and Bob Wheatcroft, a 
partner in accountancy firm Armstrong Watson . One of the initial appointees to the 59
GAAR Panel was David Heaton, a partner in accountancy firms Baker Tilly and a 
recent chairman of the Tax Faculty of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW). In September 2013, Heaton was secretly filmed 
offering tips on how to keep money "out of the chancellor's grubby mitts ". He 60
advised an audience on how they could exploit maternity pay rules "to get the 
government to pay your bonuses". Subsequently, David Heaton resigned from the 
GAAR Panel.  
The issues are captured by the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee  which 61
noted that  
ÒThe use of staff seconded from the Big Four accountants by HM Treasury 
and HMRC to help design taxes is counterproductive. The risks are two-fold: 
that those on secondment will not have any incentive to design robust, hard-
to-avoid taxes and that when they return to private practice they will be better 
placed to advise how to exploit loopholes. We recommend that the Treasury 
and HMRC should be better resourced to design and implement taxes, without 
undue dependence on short-term professional advisersÓ.   
 28,000 pages of leaked tax agreements known as Luxembourg Leaks (LuxLeaks) showed 57
that Burberry has used complex transactions to avoid taxes (http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2014/nov/05/-sp-luxembourg-tax-files-tax-avoidance-industrial-scale); Burberry 
chairman has attacked the government for attacks on tax avoidance and told the prime 
minister to Òstop moralising and rein in his rhetoric on tax avoidanceÓ (http://
www.theguardian.com/business/2013/may/20/david-cameron-tax-avoidance-multinationals).
 KPMG have a long history of marketing tax avoidance schemes. For an indication see 58
Austin Mitchell and Prem Sikka, The Pin-Stripe Mafia: How Accountancy Firms Destroy 
Societies, Basildon: Association for Accountancy & Business Affairs, 2011. In March 2016, 
the courts declared another KPMG tax avoidance scheme, this time for Stagecoach plc (see 
http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/judgmentfiles/j8863/TC04866.pdf).
 The firmÕs website states ÒTwo things in life are certain, while we canÕt influence one, we 59
love to help you save money on the other. Diversifying across all areas of taxation to 
maximise the opportunities we can offer you, our tax team specialise in different areas of 
taxation, ensuring their knowledge and expertise is always bang up to date, innovative and 
accurate, giving you the peace of mind that whatever it is, itÕs taken care ofÓ (http://
www.armstrongwatson.co.uk/tax-planning; accessed on 5 July 2016)
 BBC News, HMRC's David Heaton quits after offering tips on avoiding tax, 14 September 60
2013 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24089463).
 House of Lords Select Committee on Economic, Tackling corporate tax avoidance in a 61
global economy: is a new approach needed? London: TSO, July 2013 (http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldeconaf/48/48.pdf).
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The general point is that the government has been engaged in a privatisation of tax 
policymaking and administration and this encourages abuses. No doubt, it would be 
argued that the people from big business are neutral and seek to serve the public 
interest, but the difficulty is that in common with other citizens their conception of 
public interest is likely to be shaped by their education, business interests and 
availability of income and wealth. The economic elites sitting on HMRC Board are 
overly sympathetic to big business, especially as after their stint at HMRC the 
individuals return to big business. It may also be argued that tax is a technical subject 
and therefore HMRC needs people with the appropriate technical know-how. Such a 
technocratic view needs to be challenged. For example, tax abuses have frequently 
been highlighted by individuals who care about a good and just society and whose 
worldviews are not constrained by narrow technical knowledge and business 
interests. Such individuals can make a very effective contribution to discussion of tax 
problems and development of appropriate policies. 
There is poor public accountability of HMRC. Parliamentary scrutiny is an important 
part of accountability, but as we noted the PAC has been unable to obtain any 
meaningful documentation about what would appear to be special tax settlements 
with companies such as Google, Vodafone, Goldman Sachs and others. In the 
absence of information, it is impossible to know whether HMRC acted diligently, 
legally or indeed maximised tax revenues. HMRC Commissioners have considerable 
discretion, but that is not accompanied by public accountability. The annual report 
published by the Assurance Commissioner is not an adequate vehicle for public 
accountability. It is a one-way passive document and without availability of the details 
of the tax settlements, parliamentary committees cannot check the veracity of the 
claims made by HMRC. It is not only tax settlements: parliamentary committees are 
also unable to monitor whether HMRC obtains value for money from the resources at 
its command. For example, it has a poor record in delivering values from computer 
systems, security and privatised contracts. Whilst parliamentary committees perform 
vital tasks they cannot invigilate the HMRC board on a regular basis or enhance its 
accountability to stakeholders, especially as HMRC is too close to big business and 
has a history of failing to meet its objectives. 
Summary 
This chapter summarised the concerns arising out of our evidence and discussions 
with various stakeholders. There are considerable anxieties about poor service to 
taxpayers and lack of effective action against organised tax avoidance. HMRC is too 
close to big business and ordinary people have little opportunity to impress their 
concerns upon HMRC management.  In particular, there is a major public 
accountability deficit as some of HMRC practices even escape parliamentary 
scrutiny. The next chapter outlines a number of reforms to address such concerns. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The preceding analysis shows that HMRCÕs difficulties are associated with a lack of 
financial and human resources, transparency, public accountability and enforcement. 
This chapter outlines a number of reforms which will enhance HMRCÕs public 
accountability, make it accountable to parliament and the people and improve its 
capacity for tax collection, enforcement and more responsive public services. 
1. There should be a Supervisory Board to watch over HMRC Board to give it
direction and enhance its public accountability. The Board shall also act as a
bulwark against corporate capture and inertia. The Supervisory Board shall
consist of stakeholders and meet in the open at regular intervals. The Supervisory
Board shall not have any responsibility for the day-to-day running of HMRC. No
stakeholder group shall be in a majority, thus ensuring that dialogue and
consensus would be necessary to reach decisions. Board minutes and
background papers must be publicly available.
Board members can be appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer for a fixed
period according to a publicly declared criterion. The appointment must be
approved by the Public Accounts Committee. The appointees must declare their
commercial interests and avoid conflict of interests. Before each meeting, the
board members must declare whether they have held any prior discussions about
the subject matters under consideration with any organisation likely to be directly
affected by the discussions.
The Supervisory Board must focus on HMRCÕs ability to meet its objectives.
These are to maximise tax revenues, make sustainable cost savings, and
improve the service to customers; or any other objective decided by parliament. It
will not be specifically concerned about the affairs of any specific taxpayer. It must
ask questions about whether HMRC has adequate resources to meet its
objectives, including staffing, legal, and financial sources. It must focus on the
quality of enforcement action taken to increase tax collection, including the
number of prosecutions against large businesses, high net worth individuals and
others. It must approve all large tax settlements relating to tax disputes. It must
approve decisions to close offices or open new ones to ensure that such
developments are consistent with HMRCÕs objectives.
The Supervisory Board shall seek explanations about the value that HMRC
obtains from PFI, privatisation and outsourcing of contracts and services. It
should have an unhindered right to examine any relevant documents.
The Supervisory Board must make an annual report, which can form part of the
annual report published by HMRC, and comment on its activities, practices and
matters of public concern.
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2. The Supervisory Board should be the statutory point of contact for whistleblowers
releasing information about tax avoidance and evasion. The Supervisory Board
must develop policies for supporting tax related whistleblowers from within and
outside HMRC. Whistleblowers should be awarded protection (protection of their
job, livelihood and future employability) and a possible share of the taxes and
penalties recovered as a direct result of the information provided by them. There
should also be a broader legislation to protect whistleblowers.
3. The lack of resources is a major reason for continuing poor services and
enforcement. HMRC needs additional resources as without them it cannot meet
its objectives. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has recommended that
ÒAdequate resources need to be provided to HMRC to ensure it can efficiently 
and effectively collect taxes due and strike the right balance in relationships 
with taxpayers that encourages co-operative compliance Ó.  62
The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee  also recommended that 63
ÒHMRC needs sufficient high quality staff with deep expertise in corporate tax 
to deal effectively with the tax affairs of complex and well-resourced 
multinationals. In order to achieve this, we recommend that HMRC should be 
better resourcedÓ. 
There is a very strong economic case for increasing resources, staffing and 
related support. The data  released by HMRC shows that the financial returns 64
from investigations into large businesses for 2013/14 have jumped to £97 in extra 
tax for every £1 invested in the last year, up from £87 during the previous year. 
Both the local compliance (which investigates individual taxpayers and small 
businesses) and high net worth units collected approximately £18 for every £1 
invested in 2013/14, up from £16 over 2012/13.  The returns for various 
compliance units are summarised below. 
Compliance investigations: investment in relation to revenue (£) 
 Confederation of British Industry, A Comprehensive Business Tax Roadmap: The Way 62
Ahead, 2014 (http://news.cbi.org.uk/cbi-prod/assets/File/Comprehensive%20Business
%20Tax%20Roadmap.pdf).
 House of Lords Select Committee on Economic, Tackling corporate tax avoidance in a 63
global economy: is a new approach needed? London: TSO, July 2013 (http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldeconaf/48/48.pdf )
 HMRC investigations into large companies now yielding £97 for every £1 invested; http://64
www.pinsentmasons.com/en/media/press-releases/2015/hmrc-investigations-into-large-
companies-now-yielding-97-for-every-1-invested/
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Amount collected from compliance investigations compared to expenditure on 
compliance staff 2012/13- 2013/14 
!
*Year ending March 31 2014
In February 2016, HMRC told the PAC that it raises £75 for every £1 spent on 
investigating large businesses .  65
The above data makes a strong economic case for additional investment in HMRC. 
4. For effective and efficient service and tax collection, HMRC needs to be
embedded within the community. Whilst there is a role for information technology
and electronic filing of tax returns, there is also a need to build local intelligence,
respond to citizensÕ concerns and provide continuity. This is best achieved
through a network of local offices and staff with local knowledge.
Year Local compliance Large Business 
Service
High net worth
2011/12 1:12 1:76 1:15
2012/13 1:16 1:87 1:16
2013/14 1:18 1:97 1:18
 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Corporate Tax Settlements, London: 65
TSO, February 2016, page 3 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/
cmpubacc/788/788.pdf).
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5. HMRC should have a well resourced internal investigation and prosecution unit.
Unlike the present reliance on external advisers, this would enable HMRC to
retain the knowledge in-house and build on it. Rather than constantly relying on
external lawyers it should have in-house teams of specialist lawyers to facilitate
prosecutions and strengthen the deterrent effect.
6. HMRC is competing with large corporations, accountancy firms and financial
services companies to attract and retain good staff. All too often, it trains staff and
then due to low wages is unable to retain them. They are poached by other
organisations. This is highly disruptive and costly. HMRC needs to offer
competitive financial rewards.
7. Parliamentary committees perform a vital service in questioning HMRC
Commissioners. They shall also be able to question members of the Supervisory
Board. Any documents examined by the Supervisory Board must be made
available to the committees.
8. The tax returns, related computations and documents of all large companies must
be made publicly available. They can be filed at Companies House together with
company accounts, annual returns and other documents. The public availability of
information will help to increase the threat of naming and shaming and associated
pressures on company boards not to use aggressive tax avoidance strategies,
and thus increase tax revenues. The public availability of corporate tax returns will
improve the quality of information available to parliamentary committees to
scrutinise the effectiveness of HMRC in meeting its objectives.
9. Parliamentary committees should be empowered to examine any information, no
matter how sensitive. Confidentiality should not obstruct parliamentary scrutiny of
HMRCÕs practices. It would be up to the relevant parliamentary committee to
decide whether scrutiny of any documents and practices should be conducted in
private or closed meetings. There is precedence for this. For example, the
Intelligence and Security Committee is able to take some evidence in private.
10.The UK lacks effective judicial capacity to resolve tax disputes. In 2009/10, the
number of cases awaiting hearing at first-tier tribunals stood at 13,456 . By66
2014/15, the numbers reached 29,566 . There were also 310 appeals waiting to67
be heard by the upper tax tribunal.  A casual glance at decisions by first-tier tax
tribunals and tax courts shows that many tax cases take around a decade to be
 As per http://www.pinsentmasons.com/en/media/press-releases/2013/record-backlog-of-66
disputes-between-hmrc-and-taxpayers-as-number-of-outstanding-tribunal-cases-doubles-in-
four-years/
 As per http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/august/outstanding-uk-tax-tribunal-cases-67
reach-record-levels/
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resolved. This is not helpful to taxpayers who may have been wronged and 
continue to incur costs. Excessive delay undermines confidence in HMRC and the 
deterrent effect of prosecutions. A speedy resolution of tax disputes would not 
only facilitate early tax collection, but would also enable parliament to quickly 
address legislative weaknesses. The delay in court hearings also adds to costs as 
HMRC needs to retain external lawyers and advisers.    
We recommend an urgent expansion of the judicial capacity for hearing tax 
cases. We recommend the appointment of judges solely focused on tax matters 
as that can enable the development of an expert body of knowledge to resolve 
cases more efficiently 
11. The annual ÒHow we resolve Tax DisputesÓ report published by the HMRC
Assurances Commissioner should be strengthened. It should provide information
about the total amount of tax disputed, the amount disputed for a period of more
than one year, two years, five years, ten years, or longer. The outstanding
amounts should be analysed into appropriate categories, such as those relating to
VAT, excise duties, income tax, taxes relating to high net worth individuals
corporation tax, offshore tax avoidance/evasion, transfer pricing cases and so on.
The reasons for the dispute and delay should be provided. The report should
provide a summary of the outcomes together with details of the litigation costs
incurred by HMRC, the time spent by HMRC staff and any costs which are
recovered from the third parties.  Such disclosures would increase transparency
and accountability of HMRC.
12.Taxpayers should not have to pay any fees for contesting assessments raised by
HMRC. Under the government proposals  taxpayers will have to pay a minimum68
fee of £50, which could be for contesting an assessment of only £100. The
government recommends that the first tier and upper tribunals should charge up
to £2,000 for contesting an HMRC decision. The creation of such a regime will
further widen inequalities by ensuring that only those with wealth can dispute their
tax liabilities. The introduction of such charges could mean that many less well-off
people would suffer in silence and this would dilute the pressures on HMRC to
improve its services. We oppose the levying of charges. Of course, judges could
still declare some cases to be frivolous and award costs to HMRC.
 https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/further-fees-proposal-consultation/68
supporting_documents/Government%20response%20to%20consultation%20on
%20enhanced%20fees%20and%20consultation%20on%20further%20fees%20proposals
%20web.pdf
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13.HMRCÕs capacity to challenge abusive practices needs to be strengthened by a
rewrite of the General Anti Abuse Rule  (GAAR), introduced in 2013. The69
principle behind GAAR should be to discourage organised tax avoidance by
focusing on the economic substance rather than just the legal form of a
transaction. This way, it can be argued that many of the transactions are a sham,
because they have no economic substance and are merely designed to avoid
taxes and should thus be ignored. Under the existing GAAR transforming income
into capital through artificial transactions may not be construed as tax avoidance.
Unsurprisingly, chairman of the House of Lords Economics Committee wrote :70
ÒThe Committee stress that because the GAAR is so narrow it will not apply to 
current issues of public concern about the international tax planning 
techniques relating to tax paid by multinational companies which limit the 
amount paid in the UK ... There is a misconception that GAAR will mean the 
likes of Starbucks and Amazon will be slapped with massive tax bills. This is 
wrong and the Government needs to explain that to the public. GAAR is 
narrowly defined and will only impact on the most abusive of tax avoidanceÓ. 
The current GAAR does not apply to any tax arrangements entered into before 
the legislation came into effect even though the impact of those arrangements 
may continue for many years. It requires HMRC to apply a Òdouble 
reasonablenessÓ test and show that the tax arrangements or schemes under 
scrutiny Òcannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of actionÓ. The 
net effect of the linguistic turn is that an avoidance scheme will be treated as 
abusive only if it would not be reasonable to hold such a view. The key test is 
whether what has happened is reasonable. So, if a dubious practice is well 
established then it may well be considered to be reasonable. Who will decide 
whether the state of affairs is reasonable? The procedure is that before any 
litigation HMRC will have to make its case to a panel of so-called independent 
experts who will give their opinion as to whether the arrangements in question 
constitute a reasonable course of action. The advisory panel consists of 
individuals from companies, accountancy and law firms. Thus the tax avoidance 
industry and companies implicated in tax avoidance are in a position to shackle 
HMRC. If the panel permits HMRC to bring a case then in due course the same 
benchmarks can apply to them and their businesses too. So there is a real conflict 
of interests. If the GAAR Panel does not unanimously support counteraction then 
HMRC need to show that it has cogent reasons for continuing the process of 
counteracting the tax advantage sought by the taxpayer. If the matters somehow 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69
399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Guidance_Parts_A-
C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf
 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-70
affairs-finance-bill-sub-committee/news/fbsc-report-press-release/
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reach a court, then it may also be shackled. The guidance  issued by the 71
government states that Òthe tribunal or court must also take into account the 
opinion, or opinions, of the GAAR Advisory Panel (in practice, the sub-panel) 
given to the HMRCÓ. 
The revised GAAR must catch all sham transactions. HMRC should not be 
shackled by a panel of business people. Instead, it must seek guidance from the 
Department of Justice and/or a panel of retired judges specifically appointed to 
guide HMRC. To be effective HMRC must have complete independence from all 
business interests. This means that business interests, in common with other 
stakeholders, can be part of an open consultation process, but must not write 
laws or enforce them, or be in a position to shackle HMRCÕs capacity to pursue 
abusive practices.  
The proposals outlined here are not a panacea for deep-seated social, economic and 
political problems, but will help to strengthen HMRC by improving its resources, 
public accountability, efficiency and effectiveness.   
HMRCÕs GAAR Guidance (Approved by the Advisory Panel with effect from 15 April 2013, 71
paragraph C8.4. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/396179/gaar-part-abc.pdf)
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